Abstract -In this paper, authors propose a new Second Order Differential Power Analysis (SO-DPA) countermeasure for AES cipher. While published results for SO-DPA are proposing multiple masking solutions and the design of two independent True Random Number Generator (TRNG), the proposed design in this paper uses only one TRNG and combines a simple masking solution with the Correlated Power Noise generator (CPNG) countermeasure. This design optimization led to silicon area overhead reduction by 4% without including the area of the TRNG. Experimental results of FPGA-based hardware implementation are presented to highlight the robustness of the proposed design and its reduced complexity implementation.
INTRODUCTION
Side channel attacks use the information leaking from physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms. The analysis of this leakage reveals information on the secret data manipulated by the implementation. Among the side channel attacks, the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [1] is one of the most powerful against unprotected cryptographic implementations. This technique allows extracting the value of a secret key with only a few leakage measurements. A DPA is a statistical attack that correlates a physical leakage with the values of intermediate variables that depend on both the plaintext and the secret key. To avoid information leakage, the manipulation of sensitive variables must be protected by adding countermeasures [2] [3] .
Protected design is secured from the first order DPA attack. But they are not secured from Higher Order DPA (HO-DPA) attack. In this paper, we are interested only on the Second Order DPA (SO-DPA) attack. It needs a combing function in order to join the mutual information in two points in the traces of power consumption. The number of countermeasure in the first order is rising up to date. Unfortunately, there is a single countermeasure for the SO-DPA attack which uses multiple random masking [4] . Its basic idea is to combine two simple masking countermeasures and to use two TRNGs designed to ensure the countermeasure robustness. To overcome implementation complexity of conventional SO-DPA countermeasure while conserving target robustness the authors propose a new design that uses one TRNG and combines two first order DPA countermeasures: the simple masking countermeasure with the Correlated Power Noise generator CPNG [5] . The robustness and implementation complexity analysis of the proposed design are evaluated through experimental tests carried out on an FPGA-based hardware implementation.
This paper is organized in six sections. The second one focuses in the SO-DPA attack principle and countermeasures. In section III, we present the proposed new SO-DPA countermeasure. Experimental results of the designed countermeasure robustness evaluation are presented in section IV. In section V, we compare hardware implementation resources of proposed design with conventional technique and unsecure circuit. Finally, conclusions are given in section VI.
II. SO-DPA ATTACK PRINCIPLE AND COUNTERMEASURES

A. SO-DPA Attack description
The aim of the SO-DPA attack is to retrieve the secret key K from the leakage signals L(t) during the execution of known plaintext D in unless the existence of the First Order DPA (FO-DPA) countermeasure. The leakage signals in this attack are traces of power consumption. We need then in SO-DPA attack to collect power consumption traces from cryptographic design. Usually, the SO-DPA attack is applied in cryptographic implementation secured from the FO-DPA attack only. In this case, the masked solution is the most used one [4] . To surpass the first order countermeasure, the solution is to combine two leakage signals L(t 1 ) and L(t 2 ) at two distinct instants t 1 and t 2 . The combining functions used in the SO-DPA attack are generally the product one and the absolute difference. The second step of SO-DPA attack is to apply a differential analysis method in order to extract the secret key K. This method can be the mean distance [1], the maximum likelihood [6] test and the correlation analysis [7] . Generally, the last processing data is the most used in the SO-DPA attack. For this raison, we choose this method.
B. Combining function of SO-DPA attack
The choice of the combining function is very critical part in SO-DPA attack. It describes the method to join the information in the power consumption traces. In the literature, there are two main combining functions: the absolute difference value [8] function and the improved product function [9] . In our work [10] , we have shown that the improved product function is more efficient than the absolute value and it is adapted to second order DPA attack for hardware implementation.
C. SO-DPA Attack countermeasures
For the second order DPA attack, the only efficient countermeasure is the multiple masking introduced by Schramm [4] . Its basic idea is to use two independents masks M 1 and M 2 for the same plaintext D in . The figure 1 shows the data flow processing of this countermeasure. Piret et al [11] study the multiple masking countermeasure. This studies permits to improve the robustness of masking countermeasure. The figure 2 presents the adaptation of this countermeasure in hardware solution. ModifiedSubBytes1and ModifiedSubBytes2 are given respectively by the equations (1) and (2) 1 , , , The robustness of the multiple masking depends on the independence between the two TRNGs used in this countermeasure. We will introduce a new countermeasure with one TRNG in the next part.
III. PRINCIPLE OF PROPOSED MCPNG COUNTERMEASURE
To improve the robustness of the multiple masking countermeasure, for SO-DPA attack, we have the idea to replace one of the simple masking solution by the Correlated Power Noise Generator (CPNG) that was proposed by authors in [5] . In fact, the principle of the proposed architectural countermeasure against SO-DPA attack is to combine two firstorder-DPA countermeasures: the simple masking countermeasure [12] and the CPNG one. The figure 3 illustrates the data flow processing of this new second order Masked Correlated Power Noise Generator (MCPNG) countermeasure.
The plaintext D in is the input of the function AddMask. It applies an xor operation between D in and the random mask M. The input of the first iteration of masked AES mD in is inserted also in the masked correlated noise power generator. This generator is composed of two modules AddRoundKey and the MaskedSubytes. This last module is generated with the smallest masked S-Box [13] . In the masked correlated noise generator, we use the interference key K interf in order to generate the power noise correlated with the bloc of the useful key K.
The signals S and S interf are protected from the first DPA with the simple masking countermeasure. In order to prevent from SO-DPA attack and to make the mutual information unused, we interfere the power of the signal S with the power noise S interf . Experimental robustness of the proposed MCPNG countermeasure, for second order DPA attacks, will be presented in section IV. -Predicting the correct key by using the analysis correlation on the combined traces with power model defined by the prediction function.
We realize the second order DPA attack on the secured design from the first order DPA attack only. The experimental setup [10] is composed by an FPGA board, a digital oscilloscope connected to a computer through a GPIB IEEE-488 bus. The digital oscilloscope has 100 MHz bandwidth and 200 MS/s maximum rate sampling. The FPGA board is the Actel flash fusion AFS-600. Power consumption measurement is done by inserting a 0.2 Ω resistor between the power supply and the FPGA board. A signal trigger is generated by the board to synchronize acquisition of power consumption and time execution of the design under attack. We collect the power consumption traces of the flash FPGA based implementation design. We employ the improved product combining function. To retrieve the secret key K, we choose the correlation analysis.
B. Results of SO-DPA attack on the simple masking and CPNG countermeasures
In this part, we realize two SO-DPA attacks. The first attack is for design protected by the CPNG countermeasure only. The second one is for AES implementation secured with simple masking solution. In first attack, we consider the AES implementation secured with CPNG countermeasure. The figure 4 gives the different part of this implementation. We realize a SO-DPA attack on this design. We can retrieve the secret key as shows by result of figure 5. In the second attack, we implement the AES design secured with the simple masking solution. Figure 6 describes design under attack. We realize SO-DPA attack on this design. Measured results of figure 7 shows that we can extract the key. 
C. Results of SO-DPA attack on design secured with MCPNG countermeasure
In this experience, we use the proposed MCPNG countermeasure. In order to generate correlated masked power noise, the same masked input is applied to two blocs composed of AddRoundKey and MaskedSubBytes. Figure 8 illustrates this design. The bloc that employs the interfering key is considered to be a correlated masked power noise for the other bloc that employs the secret key K. The power consumption model chosen for correlation analysis is given by the equation (3) where H is the Hamming weight.
The second order DPA attack on the design secured with MCPNG cannot extract the secret key K. The number of traces is 20480. It is the same number that is necessary to achieve the attack as mentioned [10] . Figure 9 illustrates the failure of this attack with the correct key equal to K=43 and the multiplication point P M =153. Table I gives some correlation values for different points of multiplication. We have done the multiplication for possible values of power consumption. The attack time is about 72 hours calculated with a 2.8 GHz computer . Figure 9 . Experimental results of unsecsseful SO-DPA attack on secured design by MCPNG countermeausre ,with a number of traces 20480, the correct key K=43 The implementation of the countermeasure MCPNG needs to design two modules AddRoundKey and MaskedSubytes. The AddRoundKey module is composed of exclusive ports between key and data. The MaskedSubytes is designed by using the representation in tower field [13] . In order to compare the performances of countermeasure to multiple masking, we implement these two modules by three configurations:
-Unsecured AES S-Box using the smallest solution designed by Canright [14] ,
-Secured AES S-Box with the smallest masked S-Box multiple masking [13] ,
-Secured AES S-Box with the countermeasure MCPNG. Table II gives the implementation results with a Xilinx Virtex4 SRAM FPGA. It shows that the proposed countermeasure MCPNG use a lightly small number of hardware resources than the multiple masking implementation. The improvement of our solution is 11 slices of Virtex 4 to implement AddRoundKey and MaskedSubytes. We notice the cost of security from the second order DPA attacks is very high compared with an unsecured circuit or secured circuit from the first DPA attack.
In this comparison, we have not considered the implementation resources of the TRNG for masks generation. Hence, by considering TRNG implementation resources the proposed solution, that uses only one TRNG, lead to a significant implementation cost reduction in comparison to the multiple masking solution. Moreover the robustness of proposed solution is not only based on TRNG but also on the correlated power noise. This promises enhanced protection against fault injection attacks that never have been studied. The proposed MCPNG has the same clock frequency as the multiple masking one. The AddMask makes the critical path longer in both cases. Moreover, the MaskedSubBytes used in the two solutions has a critical path longer than the usual module SubBytes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new countermeasure called MCPNG for second order DPA attacks against AES cipher is presented.. The original design of proposed method combines two first order countermeasures to obtain a second order DPA countermeasure. Those countermeasures are the Correlated Power Noise Generator CPNG countermeasure [5] and the simple masking technique. The idea of using the masked CPNG lead to prevent the operation of mutual information in power consumption traces. The MCPNG countermeasure robustness is proved by experimental attack conducted on an FPGA-based hardware implementation. Proposed design showed a significant reduction in hardware implementation complexity when TRNG hardware resources are considered. 
